Must We Understand Before We Believe or Disbelieve in a Work of Art?

An actress representing the philosopher Hypatia
Public Domain

The "No Truth" theory asserts that to question the truth of a work of art is to cease to engage with its aesthetic qualities. The moment we question the truth of the artwork, the moment of disengagement with reality, essential to experience, is lost.

In her essay "Truth and Representation", Rosalind Hursthouse explains the argument of the "No Truth" theorists: "When one reads a poem or a novel, and thinks about it as a poem or novel, all one's beliefs about the real world should be held in abeyance." Hursthouse explains that the "no truth" theorists believe that the inclusion of language which interferes with this detachment, reduces the impact and quality of the experience.


Our Beliefs are Essential to a Full Aesthetic Experience


Hursthouse continues by disputing this claim, citing several examples, one of which is as follows: [T]he upholders of the "no truth" theory have reached the conclusion that none of one's beliefs should play a part in one's engagement with a work of art." She shows this conclusion to be absurd, by quoting two lines of a poem: 

"Their meeting made December June, 
Their every parting was to die."

Hursthouse points out that she grew up in New Zealand, where the seasons are reversed, and if she had not understood that in Europe the summer was in June, she could not have understood those lines. Therefore, our beliefs must be engaged when we are experiencing any work of art.


We must Understand Before we Believe or Disbelieve


All the same, we need to address the question of whether our conscious judgement about the truth of a statement in a work of art or literature is relevant to our evaluation from an aesthetic viewpoint. The "no truth" theory draws a distinction between understanding a statement, and decided whether or not we believe it to be true. Arnold Isenberg believes that understanding is "a priori" to believing. "When something is said to us, we understand before we can assent, and to accept or reject must take further steps in search of evidence."

Isenberg presents this example: "If I say to you, "Tout est pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles," you cannot begin to ask yourself: "Do I believe that?" if you do not understand French... And if I say to you, "My dog is remarkably intelligent," you will understand me perfectly well, but, quite possibly, pending my producing some evidence, neither believe nor disbelieve what I say." 

Therefore, Isenberg decides it is possible to understand without considering truth or falsity, which leads to his conclusion:

"[T]he understanding of a poem is something independent of any belief..." and that verification has no part in poetry criticism, only meaning.


The Case for Truth and the Leap of the Imagination


R.K. Elliott claims that truth, elegantly put, is, indeed, aesthetically pleasing. He says, "[W]hat we can imagine vividly is not always unconnected with what we know to be the case or what we are able to believe." It is a mistake to assert that because accurate description is not always aesthetic, that it can never be aesthetic. Elliott refers to the "leap of the imagination" required by aesthetic evaluation: 

"The better the poetry, the more spontaneous the leap will be and the greater the "revelatory" character of the passage."


Sources:"Truth and Representation" by Rosalind Hursthouse, Philsophical Aesthetics, The Open University, Oxford UK, Cambridge, USA, 1992."The Problem of Belief" by Arnold Isenberg, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. xiii, 1954."Poetry and Truth" by R.K. Elliott, Theories of Art and Beauty, The Open University, UK,