Comparisons in Art are Odious - Stuart Hampshire Explains Why

Copyright: Janet Cameron

Art is gratuitous, demands our attention and does not require us to theorise about it.

Are criticism and evaluation relevant to works of art in the same way that they are relevant to, for example, ethics or morality?  Stuart Hampshire, in his essay "Logic and Appreciation" believes that it is possible to be consistent with regard to ethics, which, he says: "...are needed to meet common human predicaments."

Art, on the other hand, he regards as individual and unrepeatable and from this, he concludes: "One does not need a formula or a recipe unless one needs repetitions." This seems fair comment. Why should there be a formula for evaluation if the object in questions is not in competition with any other similar object? As Hampshire asserts, art is about the particular, and there is no limit to the number of beautiful things that are specific and not in need of generalisation.

Art is Gratuitous

On the other hand, art is gratuitous, demands our attention, and does not ask us to theorise about it This doesn't mean we may not prefer one work to another, admits Hampshire, but we do not need to grade artworks one against another. "The critic may reject the work done without being required to show what the artist ought to have done..."  However, moralists are expected to decide what should have been done in place of a condemned action.

The critic is not a judge, but a spectator of the object, "exactly as it is," and "precisely this unique object... individual and unrepeatable." Stuart Hampshire allows that the critic may be analytical, helping people to perceive certain features that lead them to appreciate what they are observing. The difficulty is when the spectator-critic observes certain features as good, and then tries to proclaim other works good for displaying the same features. "Then," says Hampshire," "one looks away from the particular qualities of the particular thing."

Moving from the Particular to the General

The originality discovered from an arrangement of elements "may bear little analogy to originality found elsewhere."  Yet, can this argument be a valid means of defending Hampshire's position? To say something is original is already to compare it to previous works, and further, to find that it contains something new and different.  To make choices and exclusions involves grading. This necessarily involves comparison and evaluation, even though the work remains as it is, with its own particular features.

Monroe Beardsley's Criteria for Evaluating Artworks

Monroe Beardsley, as quoted in Colin Lyas' essay "The Evaluation of Art" defines three general criteria of merit in evaluating an artwork. These are: "unity, complexity and intensity." If the hearer or reader of the work can be persuaded to agree that the work displays one or more of these qualities, then the claim is proved by a general rule that there is something good about the work. Other descriptions, such as "it is humorous," or "it is graceful," might be apt descriptions of the work, but they do not necessarily show that it is good, unless linked to the basic criteria set out above. If they cannot be linked, it may be that there is something wrong about the work.

Stuart Hampshire says, "The common vocabulary obstructs any disinterested perceptions of things."  Beardsley appears to demonstrate this failing. Colin Lyas points out that what is not art may still have unity, and art may have unity that is not necessarily aesthetic.  A painting that has a unity in pale colours may be seen as insipid and banal." The same argument can be made against intensity and complexity; they may show ugliness. Monroe Beardsley's attempt to form general principles upon which to base value judgments fails due to the inadequacy of his premises.

The Critic Should Help Us to See, Hear and Feel

In his essay, Colin Lyas says we cannot deduce an aesthetic description from a non-aesthetic quality. Discrimination and judgement in the arts is a matter of perception, which is a point also emphasised by Hampshire. As Lyas says, "If, in seeking an ability to discriminate aesthetically, we are seeking to see, hear and feel, then it is difficult to see how proof or demonstration... can be any part of what we want from criticism...all the critic can do is help us to see something she or he has seen by directing our attention..."

However, Hampshire is convinced that creative feeling that produces truly individual aesthetic experience with its particularities defies value judgements. He says, "Where the logician's framework of problem and conclusion does not apply, the notion of "reason" loses some of its meaning also; it is unnatural to ask: "Why is that picture or sonata good?"

Evaluation is Inevitable and Inescapable

Yet, we all evaluate films, books, music and plays that we experience. It is natural. A critic should evaluate particular works, for instance:

1. When a new novel appears, critics should try to say whether it is any good.
2. Evaluation is inevitable.  If a critic perceives and then discusses the aesthetic qualities of a work, some kind of evaluation is inescapable.
3. Surely the critic must use some ordinary language, for example: "Hamlet is indecisive" or "Lady Macbeth pressures Macbeth into killing the King."

I remember once, going to a private garden party. One of the band stood up and made an announcement. "I have to say," he said, "that comparisons are odious. Even so, I just want to say the young lady in the trouser suit stands out above all the others."  It was true. The rest of us were in our standard jeans and T-shirts and, there she was, stunning in contrast, in a flecked tweed trouser suit with a tailored jacket and sharp, creased pants.

Odious or not, comparisons are here to stay. It's our nature.

Sources:

Hampshire, Stuart, "Logic and Appreciation," Art, Context and Value, Ed: Stuart Sim, The Open University, 1992.

Lyas, Colin, "The Evaluation of Art," Philosophical Aesthetics, Blackwell Publishers in Association with The Open University, 1992.