Problems of Definitions in the Philosophy of Art

Mona Lisa by Leonardo da Vinci

    

The terms 'necessary condition' and 'sufficient condition' are used to attempt to define the qualities that make a work of art. A 'necessary condition' is a quality without which the work would not meet the requirement of being judged 'art'. It should apply, in common, to all works that are described as art. For example, X is a necessary condition of Y if, and only if, Y cannot be without X.  

A 'feeling' is not a 'necessary condition of art, says the philospher, Oswald Hanfling, "...someone may create a work of art, say a beautiful vase, without any intention of passing on feelings he has lived through."

'Sufficient condition' specifies a quality that may be defined as follows: 

X is a 'sufficient condition' of Y, if X, by itself, guarantees Y. In other words, a 'sufficient condition' is present in a work of art and is sufficient in itself to justify the label of art. If the quality is not sufficient, this could be because this quality may also be present in other artefacts or works of nature that are not art. Hanfling asks if 'beauty' can be considered a 'sufficient condition' of art and concludes that it cannot. 

"No, for many natural objects, scenery, etc. are beautiful without being works of art."

Hanfling looks at a quality shown by W. Tatarkiewicz, which considers the effect of art on the receipient: "...capable of evoking delight or emotion or shock. Hanfling says this cannot stand as a 'sufficient condition' because:

"...if fond parents take photographs of their children, these may be capable of producing delight... it would not follow they were works of art."

The Historicist Fallacy

The philosopher, Monroe Beardsley, questions the 'historicist fallacy' - that philosophy cannot judge past societies or epochs in modern terms. The 'historicist fallacy' is that art means no more than how a given historical period conceives it to be, which leads to the 'radical relativist" view that no conceptual scheme is better than any other. "But, evolving a better literary theory... than they had, would not prevent us from grasping their beliefs." 

He argues that once people thought whales were fish, but that this does not prevent us from studying the early stages of the whaling industry. He says, "What we want to understand... is what is going on?"

Beardsley's Key Presuppositions

Beardsley's first meta-aesthetic is that aesthetic theory "... should mark a distinction that is theoretically significant." Secondly, "...that in selecting key terms for aesthetic theory, we ought to stay as close as convenient to ordinary use." Beardsley's third meta-aesthetic condition is that artwork "...should be of the greatest possible utility to inquirers in other fields besides aesthetics" and especially in the fields of art history and anthropology. Fourthly, he believes that "...art and the aesthetic should be conceptually linked."

Beardsley's necessary condition for art is that it should be an aesthetic experience. His sufficient conditions are that it is either "...an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked aesthetic character, or belonging to a type of arrangement typically intended to have this capacity."

In conclusion, the key presuppositions of Beardsley's theory are as follows:

·      A work of art must be an aesthetic experience where participation is active and searching.

·      It is not necessary that the artist's intention was to produce a work of art. Art can be produced by creating religious artefacts, for instance. He states, regarding the painters of Lascaux who probably did not know they were producing art, "But it does not follow that they were not producing art."

·      Other periods and cultures can be judged using modern theory in the context of their own beliefs.

Sources:

·      Beardsley, Monroe C, "Redefining Art" Theories of Art and Beauty, The Open University, 1991.

·      Hanfling, Oswald, 'The Problem of Definition' Philosophical Aesthetics, Blackwell Publishers, 1992.