Immanuel Kant on Beauty - Is an artwork good for something, or good in itself?

Immanuel Kant, Public Domain

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) develops a theory that aesthetic experience is contemplative. He achieves this through the analysis of four "Moments" which are aspects of quality, quantity, relation and modality, and these produce aesthetic feeling in the perceiver. This feeling is detached from any issues of desire, personal interest or will, and lead to a sense of disinterested one-ness with the thing itself.

The First Moment demonstrates that, in order to discern beauty, we need to use our imagination... "acting, perhaps, in conjunction with understanding." According to Kant's Critique of Judgement, this feeling is subjective and, therefore, neither cognitive nor logical.

Kant states, "Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful, which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste."  This judgement needs to be separate from what gives delight merely because it is agreeable, ie. pleasing to the senses. Such enjoyments are gratifications of inclination or desire, or, in the case of reason, of the will. Reason may dictate that a thing is useful. If so, it only pleases as a means to an end. Thus, it is "good for something" and Kant makes a clear distinction between what is "good for something" and what is "good in itself."

The agreeable may not be good; in other words, it may have disagreeable consequences. If, as Kant says, "agreeableness is enjoyment," he points out that this may not be good if it has been procured by unscrupulous means. "Happiness, with all its plethora of pleasures, is far from being the unconditioned good."  The agreeable, the good and the moral good may be partial to an interest. "For the good is the object of will, ie. a rationally determined faculty of desire."

Kant concludes this Moment by observing that the agreeable and the good are stimulated by desire, with a bond between the subject and the real existence of the object. But the judgement of taste, ie. the beautiful, differs through its disinterested feeling; it pleases and produces objective worth for rational, intelligent beings. "For Favour is the only free liking," and this is what is meant by "disinterestedness."

The Second Moment analyses the "subjective universality" attached to object. A subject, feeling disinterested delight, believes that "...he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one," and will "...speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement logical."  Agreeableness is personal, a taste or a colour being subjectively agreeable to the perceiver and disagreeable to another. But, to call an object beautiful in itself is to demand a similar response from others. Denial brings forth accusations of deficiency in taste.

The Third Movement examines the ways in which the parts of a beautiful object relate to one another, producing design. This leads to the statement that, "Analogously, a beautiful object is more than the sum of its parts."

The Fourth Moment proposes a "common sense" which is described as a "shared capacity for the exercise of taste."  This specifies that if taste is unimpaired, there must be agreement about what is beautiful. The point is to judge something beautiful subjectively and without concepts, and to do so universally.

Can Disinterestedness be Recognised?

Kant's account of aesthetic experience is consistent and, therefore, mostly satisfactory, although there are inadequacies. Diane Collinson states in her essay "Aesthetic Experience" in Philosophical Aesthetics, "Aesthetic experience, although traditionally linked to beauty, need not be confined to the experience of the beautiful."  But, even if we accept aesthetic experience as being related only to beauty, it is still inadequate, for it excludes the beauty of nature. Collinson quotes from a theory on aesthetic experience by Edward Bullough on encountering a fog at sea: "...note the curious, creamy smoothness of the water... a flavour of such concentrated poignancy and delight." Through a combination of mingled repose and terror, we are distanced from self. This is surely "disinterestedness."  Acceptance of this view exposes Kant's definition of the aesthetic which excludes nature as inadequate.

Further, as Clive Bell's criticism makes clear, Kant's emphasis on beauty, based upon design and independent of colour, is insufficient. Bell is quoted in Collinson's essay: "You cannot conceive a colourless line or a colourless space; neither can you conceive a formless relation of colours." Lines on an engraving cast shadows, so does the outline, detail and features of a statue."  Although contrasts and combinations of strong colours may not be a necessary condition for aesthetic delight, they may contribute much to the final experience of the perceiver. This latter point would not invalidate the essence of Kant's argument, but simply broaden it.

Kant's concept of "disinterested" aesthetic experience may be difficult to achieve, or even to recognise without elements of doubt, due to natural human experience. This is not to say that it may not be aspired to, although it could be that Kant's claim that universality bestows objectivity upon a work is, as explained, inadequate.

Sources:

·      Collinson, Diane, "Aesthetic Experience," Philosophical Aesthetics, Blackwell Publishers in Association with The Open University, 1992.

·      Kant, Immanuel, Reading 14, Theories of Art and Beauty, The Open University, 1991.